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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court,
Amici National Association for Public Defense and
Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers respectfully request leave to file the accompanying Amicus Curiae brief in support of the petition for writ of
certiorari in the above-referenced case.
All parties were timely notified of the intent of
these Amici to file the attached brief as required by
Rule 37.2(a). Respondents declined to give consent.
In this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court incorrectly held that a state evidentiary rule should totally
foreclose a criminal defendant’s opportunity to present
his best case in opening argument. This holding is of
critical interest to Amici, organizations that represent
criminal defense counsel who regularly practice in the
state of Kentucky. Amici have a particular and substantial interest in ensuring that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of all criminal defendants
are protected.
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Accordingly, Amici respectfully request that the
Court grant the motion for leave to file an Amicus Curiae brief.
Respectfully submitted,
L. JOE DUNMAN
Counsel of Record
DANIEL J. CANON
SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE
BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW
BRANDEIS IMPACT
LITIGATION PRACTICUM
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Counsel for Amici Curiae
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether Kentucky’s rule prohibiting counsel from
characterizing the credibility of the complaining
witness violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense
grounded in the Due Process, Confrontation, and
Compulsory Process Clauses.

2.

Whether a manifest necessity for a mistrial existed when the basis for the mistrial was counsel’s
attempts to describe the defense, i.e., that the complaining witness was lying when she accused the
defendant of sexual abuse.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The National Association for Public Defense
(NAPD) is an association of more than 14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all
U.S. states and territories. NAPD members include attorneys, investigators, social workers, administrators,
and other support staff who strive to fulfill the constitutional right to counsel through zealous, clientcentered representation. NAPD members are advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in communities and
understand both theoretical best practices and how to
apply them in the day-to-day delivery of defense services. Their collective knowledge and skill is at work in
state, county, and local systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel delivery mechanisms,
through dedicated juvenile, capital and appellate offices, and through a diversity of traditional and holistic
practice models. NAPD provides webinar-based and
live training programs that emphasize the utmost importance of providing vigorous defense advocacy across
all phases of representation as contemplated by fundamental constitutional due process and Sixth Amendment guarantees. Those phases include opening
statements that forecast the centrality of witness credibility to the defense theory of a case. Accordingly,
1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part. No one other than Amici Curiae, its members or Amici’s
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for all parties
received notice at least ten days prior to the due date of Amici’s
intention to file this brief. A Motion for Leave to File Brief for
Amicus Curiae is attached.
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NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this
case.
The Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (KACDL) is a non-profit organization composed of attorneys who practice criminal law in the
Kentucky Court of Justice. The attorney members and
their clients are directly affected by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision to categorically prohibit a direct statement of the defense during opening
statement where the defense to criminal charges is
that a witness is lying. The Association views the opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky as a serious infringement on the federal constitutional right to
present a complete defense and foresees the disastrous
effect the opinion will have on members’ obligation to
provide effective representation in criminal prosecutions conducted in Kentucky.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By silencing criminal defense lawyers during
opening statement – the crucial first opportunity to
present the defense theory of the case – the Kentucky
Supreme Court has imposed dangerous limitations on
rights guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. More specifically, by misapplying an evidentiary rule designed to check prosecutorial misconduct, those courts have eliminated the crucial first
opportunity of criminal defendants to alert jurors that
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the sole issue in a case is the credibility of the complaining witness. This radical restriction on defense
advocacy does not merely fly in the face of broad consensus among courts and commentators on the crucial
role of the opening statement in setting a framework
for juror comprehension of what they are about to see
and hear during trial. The decisions of the Kentucky
courts strike a harsh and fundamentally unfair blow
against defendants’ due process rights to be heard as
well as their rights to confront the witnesses against
them and to present a defense. Denying defendants the
opportunity to highlight the single factual question
upon which their liberty turns is antithetical to our
system of adversarial fact finding. For the foregoing
reasons, this Court should grant certiorari and reverse.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
This Court should grant certiorari and hold that
the Supreme Court of Kentucky violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments by misapplying an evidentiary rule to prevent defense counsel from using opening statement to highlight the credibility of the
complaining witness as the sole issue in this case.
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I.

Opening statements are a long-standing,
crucial component of the trial process and
of a criminal defendant’s constitutionallyprotected presentation of a complete defense.

This Court has recognized a resolute principle in
our constitutional system: “The right of an accused in
a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
(1973). Traditionally, that opportunity to defend has
included an opening statement. As this case demonstrates, fundamental rights secured under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated where, as
here, a criminal defendant seeks to use opening statement to forecast his challenge to the credibility of the
complaining witness as the sole issue in the case. This
Court should bring much-needed clarity to this area of
law by correcting the Kentucky Supreme Court’s constitutional error.
Opening statements have been “long accepted as
established and traditional in jury trials.” United
States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975);
Garner v. State, 374 P.2d 525, 528 (1962) (“After the
jury has been selected and sworn, every criminal trial
has three phases – the opening statement, the proof
and the summation.”). The opportunity to make an
opening statement is ingrained in our adversarial process because it is the first time that counsel can speak
directly to the jury in a way that provides a framework
for jurors to consider the evidence and issues that are
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about to unfold in the courtroom. The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy’s nationally-renowned
trial skills program focuses on the opening as a crucial
phase in communicating defense theory. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY, KY DPA LITIGATION
PERSUASION INSTITUTE: NEW AND ADVANCED PERSUASION
LABORATORY, KDPA.gov, http://dpa.ky.gov/who_we_are/
Education/Documents/LPI%20Schedule%202015.pdf.
The American Bar Association recognizes the opening
statement as a critical opportunity for counsel to
develop a connection with jurors. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPENING STATEMENTS: GENERAL RULES AND GUIDELINES, ABA.org, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012-aviation/
2012-aviation-opening-statements-general-rules-guidelines.
authcheckdam.pdf.
This Court acknowledged more than eighty years
ago that opening statements can make or break a case.
Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934) (trial
court may direct verdict based solely on opening statement). There is truth in the conventional wisdom that
one does not get a second chance to make a first impression. “[T]he jury forms its first and often lasting
impression of the case” during the opening. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 626 A.2d 109, 113 (1993). See
also Maleh v. Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 491 So. 2d 290,
291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Binegar v. Day, 120
N.W.2d 521, 525 (1963) (“At this stage of the trial, the
jury is peculiarly alert and impressionable.”). And academics concur: the opening statement is crucial because it establishes the framework through which the
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jury will view the evidence as it is revealed throughout
the rest of the trial. Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and
Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First Rodney
King Assault Trial, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2005).
The theory of primacy proposes that “people best
remember things they hear first.” John L. Calcagni III,
Esq., Contesting the Constitutionality of Restricting
Criminal Defendant Opening Statements, 53 Feb.
R.I.B.J. 5, 8 (January/February 2005). Repeated studies have demonstrated that overwhelming majorities
of jurors and jury verdicts are strongly affected by
opinions formed during opening statement. See, e.g.,
S.S. Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at
Trial, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 27 (1996) (70%
of jurors formed opinions on the appropriate verdict
following opening statements and retained those opinions through the end of the trial); H.P. Weld & E.R.
Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is
Reached by a Jury, 53 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 518, 529, 532
(1940) (70-90% of jurors’ final verdicts were consistent
with their opinions during opening statements).
Lawyers use opening statements to present the
evidence in such a way that jurors can easily understand how it is connected and the implications that can
be drawn from those connections. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
A well-executed opening also presents the evidence in
the most compelling way possible, that is, through a
strong narrative framework to suggest how the evidence leads to a specific result. Weyman I. Lundquist,
Advocacy in Opening Statements, 8 LITIG. 23 (Spring
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1982). A strong narrative structure, consisting of details and coding, paints a vivid picture in the juror’s
mind. Alper et al., 12 CLIN. L. REV. at 15. Coding is the
psychological “process by which words, images, objects,
and ideas become associatively linked with others, so
that the former bring the latter to mind.” Id. The goal
is to create “strong mental images that will endure
throughout the trial.” Gerald Reading Powell, Opening
Statements: The Art of Storytelling, 31 STETSON L. REV.
89, 90 (2001).
These cases, academic studies, and performance
guidelines demonstrate that the opening statement is
a crucial component of any full and competent defense,
a right which the Sixth Amendment protects. Unfortunately, a lack of guidance from this Court made it possible for the Supreme Court of Kentucky to eviscerate
that component. The Court should seize this opportunity to clarify the law by vindicating the criminal
defendant’s right to alert jurors during opening statement that the credibility of the complaining witness is
the sole issue upon which the defendant’s liberty depends.
II.

This Court should resolve conflicts among
state and federal courts regarding whether
a trial judge can impede the ability of a defendant to assert his only plausible defense
during opening statements.

This Court has offered no specific guidance on
whether a trial court may limit the scope of an opening
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argument so as to effectively bar a criminal defendant’s only plausible defense. But this Court has said
that, “an essential component of procedural fairness is
an opportunity to be heard,” and thus, “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 684, 690 (1986). “A person’s right to
. . . an opportunity to be heard in his defense – a right
to his day in court – are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a
right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948).
The Constitution explicitly ensures to a person accused of a crime the opportunity to confront the witnesses brought against him. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), this Court held
that a trial court misapplied a state evidentiary rule to
violate the Confrontation Clause when the trial judge
prevented a defendant from “ ‘[exposing] to the jury the
facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw
inferences relating to the reliability of the witness’ ” on
cross examination. Id. at 231 (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)). These fundamental
constitutional principles, rooted in the universal promise of fairness for all criminal defendants, are directly
contravened by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s misapplication of yet another evidentiary rule in the case at
bar.

9
A. State and Federal Courts are in conflict
regarding the degree to which a trial
judge may regulate the presentation of
a defense in opening statements.
Though it is true that “the weight of authority in
the federal courts and in the states has either granted
or implied that a criminal defendant has a basic right
to make an opening statement” under the Sixth
Amendment, this Court has yet to explicitly address
the issue despite conflicting approaches in state and
federal courts over the scope of judicial discretion in
regulating the content of defendants’ opening statements. Richard W. Lewis, Comment: Opening Statement: A Constitutional Right?, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
623 (1984).
In United States. v. Doyle, 121 F.3d 1078, 1093 (7th
Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit held that a district
court abused its discretion by preventing a criminal
defendant’s attorney from referencing prosecutorial
misconduct in opening arguments but allowing the defense to argue regarding the reliability of a government witness. The court determined that Doyle was
“certainly entitled to present a defense which was
based on attacking the credibility” of a government
witness. Id. at 1094. The court concluded that, though
the district court acted within its discretion in limiting
the scope of opening arguments regarding a collateral
issue of prosecutorial misconduct, the trial judge would
have been foreclosed from barring counsel from articulating the primary elements of their defense. Id.
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Doyle represents the proper exercise of judicial
discretion in the regulation of opening statements by
honoring the fundamental interests protected by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Implicit in the
Seventh Circuit’s Doyle decision is the underlying
principle that a defendant’s sole defense cannot be
barred from opening statements, particularly when
that defense turns entirely on attacking the credibility
of key government witnesses. Id. at 1093 (“Doyle was
certainly entitled to present a defense which was based
on attacking the credibility of the cooperating [prosecution] witnesses and illustrating their bias or motive
to fabricate.”). While the Doyle holding provides some
room for judicial discretion in narrowing the parameters of opening statements at trial, it proscribes a trial
judge from totally denying a defendant her constitutional rights to be heard and to mount a meaningful
challenge to the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
Other federal courts have ruled similarly. The
First Circuit robustly affirmed the critical importance
of the criminal defendant’s opening statement by enshrining it in its own rules and holding that “a defendant in a criminal case has a right to make an opening
regardless of whether he intends to call witnesses, and
may do so immediately after the prosecutor’s opening,
absent good cause shown to the contrary.” United
States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 858 (1st Cir. 1982).
The Ninth Circuit also expressly acknowledged that
the opening statement is a “well established and practical custom” in criminal jury trials, which “should be
continued in the district courts of this circuit.” United
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States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975).
By contrast, the Second Circuit has held that an opening statement is subject to the court’s discretion.
United States v. Salovitz, 701 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“We believe that an opening statement by the defendant is not such a guaranteed right, and that the making and timing of opening statements can be left
constitutionally to the informed discretion of the trial
judge.”).
Similarly, state courts disagree as to whether
opening statements should be guaranteed by right or
by custom, or whether they may be circumscribed if
criminal defendants seek to challenge witness credibility. Like the Seventh Circuit, the Missouri Supreme
Court recently upheld the right to a defense opening
statement that questions the credibility of prosecutorial witnesses. State v. Thompson, 68 S.W.3d 393, 395
(Mo. 2002). Even though “the scope of opening statements is within the discretion of the trial court,” the
Thompson court held, “an absolute ban on reference to
all cross-examination testimony denies the defendant
. . . the right to an opening statement.” Id. (emphasis
added).
The Idaho Supreme Court, by contrast, has held
that “opening remarks should be confined to a brief
summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce,”
and counsel “should not at that time attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of the evidence
that the opposing side has or will present.” State v.
Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975).
Here, the Kentucky Supreme Court similarly held that
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defense counsel may not use an opening statement to
present the theory of the case that the complaining
witness is “lying or faking,” nor may they even offer a
framework for jurors to view the evidence as supporting any “conclusions about the credibility of a witness”
in opening statements. Sneed v. Burress, 500 S.W.3d
791, 795 (Ky. 2016), reh’g denied (Oct. 20, 2016).
These conflicting conceptions of opening statements and their intersections with fundamental constitutional guarantees create gaps in the Sixth
Amendment’s protection of criminal defendants from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, both state and federal.
Those gaps are particularly dangerous where, as here,
trial courts accept prosecution arguments that “give no
effect to the details” of core rights that the Framers designed to check the concentrated exercise of government power against the individual. United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006). Prior decisions of this Court have consistently rejected the misapplication of evidentiary rules to truncate core
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S.
at 231 (evidentiary rules cannot trump defendants’ opportunity to challenge the reliability of witnesses).
This Court should grant certiorari and resolve the conflict among state and federal courts over a defendant’s
right to use the opening statement to present his theory of the case when that theory turns on the reliability
of the complaining witness. Any other response from
this Court will only compound the inequity in the
application of the fundamental principle that every
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criminal defendant has a right to present his whole defense and a right to confront his accuser.
B. The unconstitutional denial of a criminal defendant’s first, crucial opportunity to frame the issues in his case will
increase the risk of false convictions.
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s attack on criminal
defendants’ procedural and constitutional rights creates serious new risks of wrongful conviction, particularly in cases involving rape and sexual assault. The
misapplication of evidentiary rules turns regulation of
the criminal trial upside down by chilling counsel’s attempts to assert a defense in opening statement and
impermissibly restricting the opportunity to raise reasonable doubt regarding the central question upon
which the defendant’s liberty turns.
The subversion of these procedural and constitutional protections heightens the risk of wrongful convictions in rape and sexual assault cases. Only 19% of
police investigations in rape and sexual assault cases
lead to the collection of physical evidence. Michael
Planty et al., FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
1994-2010, 7 (2016) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvsv9410.pdf. Because physical evidence in sex
crime cases is rare, prosecutors and defense counsel often rely exclusively on witness testimony. In the vast
majority of cases, the only viable path forward for a defendant in a rape or sexual assault case is to draw the
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veracity of the accuser and other key witnesses into
doubt.
By precluding criminal defendants from informing
jurors in opening statement of the defense theory that
a witness is lying, the Kentucky Supreme Court also
has ratcheted up the already overwhelming pressures
on defendants to plead guilty in cases which should
be properly tried before a jury. See, e.g., Marie
Gottschalk, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 266-67 (Princeton Univ.
Press 2015); William J. Stuntz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58-59 (Belknap Press 2011). In
particular, allowing this rule to stand will result in yet
more guilty pleas from innocent men and women. See
Stuntz, supra; see also Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A.
Edkins, Criminal Law: The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). The National Registry of Exonerations (NROE), which collects information about all
known exonerations of innocent criminal defendants in the United States from 1989 to present, has
concluded that in non-drug cases, 10% of exonerations
include guilty pleas. Innocents Who Plead Guilty,
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015)
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). The
NROE also concludes that 8% (37/466) of all sexual assault exonerations included an innocent person pleading guilty. Id. It stands to reason that silencing a
defendant who is attempting to use the crucial phase
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of opening statement to inform jurors of his only defense – a challenge to the credibility of the complaining
witness – will result in an increased incidence of
wrongful conviction via both trial and plea agreement.
The Kentucky case of Ben Kiper, which has troubling similarities to the instant case, illustrates the
devastating effects of false witness testimony. Ben
Kiper, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24,
2015), (AUG. 26, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3353. Like
Petitioner Sneed, Kiper had been charged with sexual
abuse crimes against his stepdaughter, and was convicted with no accompanying physical evidence or any
other evidence besides testimony that the abuse had
occurred. Id. After alleging sexual abuse at a custody
hearing between her mother and father, Kiper’s stepdaughter eventually told providers in a children’s hospital that her accusations were false. Kiper served six
years in prison for a crime he did not commit. Id.
Kiper’s ordeal underscores the tenuous nature of convictions that turn solely on uncorroborated “he-saidshe-said” evidence. If defense counsel can challenge the
veracity of an accuser from the beginning of a trial, the
trier of fact will have a better opportunity to consider
all relevant factors prior to conviction. This Court
should mitigate the risk of wrongful convictions by
granting certiorari and reversing the decision of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in this case.
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III. This case presents a perfect vehicle to clarify and protect the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants.
This case presents the Court with an excellent opportunity to resolve an important constitutional issue:
whether, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal defendants have a right to present
their best defense in their opening statements. The
new legal rule established by the Kentucky Supreme
Court has vastly diminished the right to effectively
present a defense. When the prosecution relies only on
complaining witness testimony, as is often the case,
this rule leaves a very large number of criminal defendants with no effective means of defense.
Clarity is needed. This Court has rarely resolved
issues arising from opening statements, and none to
the extent necessary to provide guidance in cases such
as this. In Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978), a
robbery case which “essentially was a swearing contest
between victim and accused,” this Court held that the
“refusal to give petitioner’s requested instruction on
the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of
his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 48788, 490. In that case, the prosecution’s opening statement repeatedly suggested that the defendant’s status
as a defendant tended to establish guilt. Id. The Court
found that the prosecution’s actions in the opening
statement led to “possible harmful inferences . . .
creat[ing] a genuine danger that the jury would convict
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petitioner on the basis of those extraneous considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial.”
Id. at 488. However, the Court never reached any constitutional questions regarding the scope of opening
statements or the proper role of opening statements in
presenting the defense theory of the case.
In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), this
Court found that where defense counsel made an improper comment in opening statement, the trial judge
had broad discretion to decide whether to give the jury
a curative instruction or ultimately declare a mistrial.
However, this Court has not decided whether this same
rationale applies when the defendant’s only theory of
the case is deemed to be improper, or whether the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments can tolerate a rule foreclosing any reference in opening statement to a defense theory of the case that challenges the credibility
of the complaining witness.
This Court has denied certiorari when similar
questions have arisen but were complicated by other
issues, or dealt with prosecutorial (rather than defense) misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Somers,
496 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir.) (finding the prosecution’s
use of “overly dramatic” and “unnecessary characterizations” during opening statement with no subsequent
supporting evidence should not lead to an automatic
finding of misconduct), cert. denied, Somers v. U.S., 419
U.S. 832 (1974); United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586,
590 (3d Cir.) (“[t]rials are rarely, if ever, perfect and improprieties of argument by counsel to the jury do not
call for a new trial unless they are so gross as probably
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to prejudice the defendant and the prejudice has not
been neutralized by the trial judge before submission
of the case to the jury.”), cert. denied, Wright v. U.S., 409
U.S. 915 (1972); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963,
978-79 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding “[a]s long as the opening
statement avoids references to matters that cannot be
proved or would be inadmissible, there can be no error,
much less prejudicial error.”), cert. denied, Pecic v. U.S.,
475 U.S. 1110 (1986); United States v. White, 486 F.2d
204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1973) (despite prosecutor improperly asserting in closing his own belief in defendant’s
guilt, twice charging defendant with “lying” and repeatedly indicating the defense was “fabricated,” court
concludes “reversal is not warranted here if we view
his conduct, as we must, in the context of the entire
trial”), cert denied, White v. U.S., 415 U.S. 980 (1974);
Morris v. Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1275 (10th Cir.) (finding that a state evidentiary rule “must sometimes yield
to the constitutional right to present a defense”), cert.
denied, Morris v. Ortiz, 540 U.S. 909 (2003).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has broadly held
that counsel may not present a full defense if their theory of the case turns entirely on witness credibility.
Without clarity from this Court, many defendants will
be forced to choose whether to risk a mistrial by opening with their best arguments, or to follow the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rule and hope the jury will
discern those arguments on their own over the course
of the trial, or, worse, be forced to accept a plea agreement despite their innocence.

19
The fact that the question presented arises in the
context of an opening statement means that this issue
will only rarely present itself so neatly in the future.
This Court will only have another opportunity to review this specific issue in the small percentage of cases
in which counsel’s opening statement is deemed to violate a rule against witness impeachment and a mistrial results.2 Because it is more likely that defense
counsel will obediently conform to the new rule and
thus sacrifice the fullness of their clients’ defenses in
order to avoid a mistrial, there will be few opportunities to test the rule via appeal. Furthermore, not being
able to present a full defense in cases based only on the
testimony of an accuser may result in more pre-trial
plea agreements, again robbing the appellate system
of opportunities to review the rule.
------------------------------------------------------------------

2

It is possible that opportunities could arise in cases where
counsel attempts to refer to an anticipated defense that the prosecution’s witnesses are untruthful, objects to the trial court’s adverse ruling, and preserves the issue for appeal. However, because
the instant petition comes to the Court in the context of a mistrial,
it raises the issue with far greater clarity than a case appealed
after trial is likely to present to this Court. Myriad questions may
arise during trial that could make it unclear whether the court’s
ruling limiting the opening statement was determinative, and as
such, cloud the case as an appropriate vehicle for addressing the
issue. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in case in
which instruction given to the jury at trial meant that the case
did not squarely present the constitutional issue which the Court
had granted for review).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should grant review and reverse in order to resolve a jurisdictional conflict that undermines
fundamental protections inscribed by the Framers in
our Constitution to check the exercise of concentrated
government power against individuals, their lives, and
their liberty.
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